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GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS AND GLOBAL HEALTH
DAVID GARTNER*
INTRODUCTION
Many of today’s biggest global challenges reflect failures of collective
action in providing global public goods. When it comes to preventing
pandemic disease, climate change, or weapons proliferation, there are
strong incentives for national governments not to cooperate to provide
optimal levels of global public goods. In order to better understand those
incentives in the context of global health challenges, leading categories for
distinguishing different types of global public goods ought to be reconceptualized as highlighting different stages of production of global
public goods. While the conventional wisdom remains that wider
participation is essentially an obstacle to effective collective action,
leveraging the contributions of diverse actors can contribute to catalyzing
the effective provision of global public goods.
This article advances a new analytical approach to the challenge of
providing global public goods that highlights the distinct problems of
innovation, financing, and compliance. Part I analyzes the major obstacles
to providing global public goods and the existing frameworks for
conceptualizing these obstacles. Part II uses existing frameworks to analyze
several specific global health challenges in order to gain insight into the
different dimensions of global public goods production and the growing
role of non-state actors in providing global public goods. Part III introduces
an alternative approach to conceptualizing global public goods and
highlights its implications for governance and global public goods.
I. CATEGORIZING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS
Recent scholarship has highlighted the significant institutional and
legal obstacles involved in the provision of global public goods, but such
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problems have been recognized for many years.1 The concept of public
goods was first highlighted three centuries ago by David Hume.2 He
identified what has come to be known as the “free rider” problem: the
incentive for an individual to “free himself of the trouble and expense,
and . . . lay the whole burden on others.”3 Since that time, the concept of
public goods has been elaborated upon by many leading economic thinkers.
Adam Smith recognized the existence of certain goods
which though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great
society are, however, of such a nature that the profits could never repay
the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, and which
it therefore cannot be expected that any individual or small number of
individuals should erect.4

The challenge with such public goods is that there are weaker incentives
for private provision because their benefits generally cannot be made
excludable and their consumption generally cannot be made exclusive.
The challenge of providing public goods is commonly viewed as
becoming increasingly difficult as the number of participants involved
expands. This view reflects Mancur Olson’s work on collective action
problems and his conclusion that the obstacles to cooperation increase
along with the number of participants whose cooperation is required.5
Olson found that only small groups, or those groups with selective
incentives, will collectively organize. The larger the group, Olson argued,
the “farther it will fall short in providing the optimal amount of a collective
good.”6 Even today, the conventional wisdom reflects his view that wider
participation generally makes the provision of public goods less likely.

1. See Daniel Bodansky, What’s in a Concept? Global Public Goods, International Law, and
Legitimacy, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L (forthcoming 2012); William D. Nordhaus, Some Foundational and
Transformative Grand Challenges for the Social and Behavioral Sciences: The Problem of Global
Public Goods (unpublished manuscript) (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1889357; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Economic Law, “Public Reason”, and
Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 23 (2011); Gregory
Shaffer, International Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal Pluralist World, EUR. J. INT’L L.
(forthcoming 2012).
2. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 538 (1739).
3. Id.
4. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
210-11 (1802).
5. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 53 (1994).
6. Id. at 35 (emphasis omitted).
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National governments often overcome these challenges by stepping in
and providing many important public goods at the national level, but at the
global level, the lack of effective governance multiplies the challenge of
collective action. Twenty-five years ago, Charles Kindelberger highlighted
the fact that in a world without effective governance, it was unclear who
would ensure the provision of global public goods.7 Contemporary
economists continue to identify the lack of any “governmental
mechanisms” for the provision of global public goods as the key obstacle to
overcoming this market failure.8 The limited capacity of existing
international institutions allows many national governments to free-ride
rather than contribute and constrains progress on many key global public
goods challenges.
In response to these challenges, scholars have sought to categorize
different types of global public goods in order to better understand the
major obstacles to their provision. One of the most ambitious attempts to
categorize global public goods was outlined by Scott Barrett in his book
Why Cooperate?: The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods. Barrett
points out that some global public goods can be supplied only if every
country cooperates, some global public goods demand the cooperation only
of certain countries, and some require only the best effort of a single
country.9 For “weakest-link” global public goods, which require the
participation of every country for success, Barrett offers the example of
smallpox elimination.10 In the case of smallpox, unless the population of
every single country was successfully vaccinated, no country would benefit
from the elimination of the threat posed by the disease. For “aggregate
effort” global public goods, which require cooperation by some but not all
countries, he offers the example of climate change mitigation.11 Without
the major emitters reducing their emissions, reducing greenhouse gas
production is unlikely to succeed, but it does not necessarily require all
countries to participate in order to do so. For “single best-effort” global
public goods, which may require action only by a single country, Barrett
offers the example of deflecting an asteroid to prevent a collision with the
7. See Charles Kindelberger, International Public Goods Without Government, 76 AM. ECON.
REV. 1, 8 (1986).
8. See William Nordhaus, Some Foundational and Transformative Grand Challenges for Social
and Behavioral Sciences: the Problem of Global Public Goods 2 (Oct. 3, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1889357.
9. See SCOTT BARRETT, WHY COOPERATE?: THE INCENTIVE TO SUPPLY GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS
2 (2007 ). Barrett’s work builds on the insights of Jack Hirsleifer, From Weakest Link to Best Shot: The
Voluntary Provision of Public Goods, 41 PUB. CHOICE 371 (1983).
10. Id. at 47-48.
11. Id. at 74-102.
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Earth.12 One country could develop the technology needed to protect
against the planetary threat of an asteroid and provide a global public good
that might protect all of humanity.
Barrett’s typology is an extremely valuable contribution to analyzing
how different kinds of global public goods might require different types of
institutional responses to ensure adequate provision. Yet it suffers from two
important weaknesses that can undercut its capacity to be translated into
effective institutional design. First, many global public goods do not fit into
only one of the categories which Barrett outlines. Indeed, in different parts
of his book, vaccines emerge as a weakest-link public good, in terms of the
difficulty of eliminating diseases in failing states;13 a single best-effort
public good, in terms of the discovery of vaccines;14 and as an aggregate
effort public good, in terms of financing mass vaccination campaigns.15
Second, Barrett’s account focuses almost exclusively on the role of states
but in the twenty-first century it is non-state actors who are increasingly
central to ensuring the provision of global public goods.
Looking at specific global health challenges, the difficulty in fitting
different global public goods into neat categories becomes even clearer. In
fact, many important global health challenges have the qualities of
weakest-link, aggregate effort, and single best-effort public goods all at the
same time. Instead of viewing these categories as referring only to different
types of global public goods, it is more helpful to view them as
highlighting different stages of the production of global public goods. In
the context of global health, innovation often requires only a single besteffort, while the financing of global public goods generally requires an
aggregate effort, and compliance depends upon overcoming the challenge
of the weakest-link. Understood in this way, these categories can be even
more valuable in thinking about the type of governance structures which
are required to ensure the provision of global public goods. At the same
time, a clearer focus on these distinct production stages of global public
goods reveals the limits of state-centric approaches and highlights the need
to better incorporate the role of non-state actors into an analysis of global
public goods.

12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 22-37.
Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 54-57.
Id. at 123-32.
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II. GLOBAL HEALTH AND GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS
Over the last decade, the framework of global public goods has
increasingly been applied to analyze global health challenges.16 While
many important global health issues cannot easily be categorized as global
public goods challenges, controlling emerging infectious diseases and
entirely eradicating diseases both lend themselves to such an analysis.17
The prevention and containment of infectious or communicable diseases is
a classic case of a global public good. A new strain of influenza, for
example, could cause tremendous loss of life in all countries around the
world. Eradicating a communicable disease, such as polio, is a special case
which holds enormous potential global benefits. Eradicating polio and
combating pandemic flu reveal the difficulty in categorizing specific global
health challenges as different types of global public goods and highlight the
increasingly important role of non-state actors in the provision of global
public goods.
A. Polio
Polio eradication is at once a single best-effort, an aggregate effort,
and a weakest-link global public good. Successful vaccination campaigns
in Latin America catalyzed the launch of a Global Polio Eradication
Initiative in 1988, which sought to build on the successful model of
smallpox eradication.18 Tremendous progress since that time has been
based on the discovery of a vaccine many decades earlier, the financial
contributions of diverse donors, and the incorporation of decentralized
approaches to ensuring compliance. Despite significant gains in recent
years, complete polio eradication is not yet a reality.19
The current polio vaccine was invented by a single scientist, funded
by a single nation, and reflects the characteristics of a “single best-effort”
global public good. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who himself suffered
from the disease, helped to establish the United States National Foundation

16. See, e.g., David P. Fidler, Germs, Governance, and Global Public Health in the Wake of
SARS, 113 CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 799 (2004).
17. See Richard Feachem & Jeffrey Sachs, GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS FOR HEALTH: THE REPORT
OF WORKING GROUP TWO OF THE COMMISSION FOR MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH 4-5 (2002).
18. R.W. Sutter & C. Maher, Mass Vaccination Campaigns for Polio Eradication: An Essential
Strategy for Success, 304 CURRENT TOPICS IN MICROBIOLOGY & IMMUNOLOGY 195, 203-05 (2006).
19. In the last decade of the twentieth century, polio cases declined by ninety nine percent from
an estimated 350,000 to fewer than 500 cases by 2001. UNICEF, POLIO ERADICATION (2001), available
at http://www.unicef.org/specialsession/about/sgreport-pdf/20_PolioEradication_D7341Insert _English
.pdf; Earth Policy Institute, Two Stories of Disease: Smallpox and Polio (Sept. 15, 2011),
http://www.earth-policy.org/data_highlights/2011/highlights19.
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for Infantile Paralysis in 1938.20 The National Foundation lavishly financed
a number of top scientists, including Dr. Jonas Salk who invented a vaccine
after nearly a decade of focused research on polio.21 The National
Foundation also conducted the Salk Vaccine Field Trials, involving nearly
two million children in the United States, to test the efficacy of the
vaccine.22 Without unprecedented investment by a single institutional actor
in a single country, the polio vaccine, which is now so central to global
eradication efforts, might not exist and certainly would have taken much
longer to be developed.
In terms of financing the eradication of polio, the ongoing challenge
reflects the characteristics of an aggregate effort public good. Given the
extremely high ratio of global benefit to the cost of disease eradication, one
might expect that it would be among the easiest global public goods for
which to secure financing. Yet even smallpox took nearly two centuries to
eradicate. The international community struggled to raise the financing
needed to complete the campaign to eliminate smallpox because the World
Health Organization (WHO) lacked the authority to compel contributions
from member states.23 Similarly with polio, the WHO found that the lack of
adequate finance poses “the single greatest threat to realizing the historic
eradication goal.”24 The polio eradication campaign was ultimately able to
fund a comprehensive global response only because of significant
contributions by non-state actors.25 The Rotary Club became one of the
most important donors to the initiative, contributing approximately $1
billion to the effort.26 In more recent years, the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation has stepped into a key financing role and catalyzed renewed
interest among many other donors.27
Although the polio eradication campaign made enormous progress in
its early years, efforts to secure the level of compliance necessary to
eliminate the disease display weakest-link characteristics. Eliminating the
last one percent of cases has proven enormously difficult and a resurgence

20. DAVID OSHINSKY, POLIO: AN AMERICAN STORY-THE CRUSADE THAT MOBILIZED THE
NATION AGAINST THE 20TH CENTURY’S MOST FEARED DISEASE 53 (2005).
21. Id. at 5.
22. See id. at 6.
23. Scott Barrett, The Smallpox Eradication Game, 130 PUBLIC CHOICE 179, 180 (2007).
24. Id. at 182.
25. R. Bruce Aylward et al., Polio Eradication, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS FOR HEALTH 40
(Richard Smith et al. eds., 2003).
26. Id. at 41.
27. UK and Gates Foundation Commit to Polio Eradication, U.K. DEP’T FOR INT’L DEV (Jan. 28,
2011), http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/latest-news/2011/polio-eradication-with-gates-foundation/.
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of polio quadrupled the number of cases between 2001 and 2005.28 An
important contributor to this reversal was the decision by several states in
northern Nigeria to suspend their vaccination campaigns after some
religious leaders endorsed rumors that the polio vaccine caused infertility.29
In the wake of this reversal of progress, community ownership of
immunization programs became a major priority in many areas of high
non-compliance. After an outbreak in India, the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative began successfully working with informal social networks and
training community members as local champions.30 In India, religious
leaders endorsed the vaccination campaign and thousands of women were
recruited to spread the message door-to-door as part of an overall effort by
2.3 million vaccinators to successfully vaccinate 900 million children in
2011. As of the beginning of 2012, India was removed from the list of
endemic countries but polio remains a serious challenge in countries such
as Nigeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.31
The example of polio highlights how a single global health challenge
can at once reflect the characteristics of single best-effort, aggregate effort,
and weakest-link public goods. Viewing these categories as reflecting the
different stages of global public goods production offers greater
understanding of the unique challenges involved in each stage of
production. The challenge of polio eradication reveals the growing
importance of non-state actors at each stage: from the discovery of the
polio vaccine, to the resource mobilization for polio eradication, to
successful vaccination campaigns in hard to reach communities.
B. Pandemic Flu
Among global health challenges, an emerging flu virus is one of the
deadliest potential threats for which global collective action is required. In
the United States alone, the Spanish influenza virus in the early twentieth
century infected more than a quarter of the population and killed two and a
half percent of all those infected.32 Although the most recent new flu strain
proved less deadly than feared, it could well be a precursor to future
mutations that pose a much greater threat. Without significantly improved
28. Heidi Larson & Isaac Ghinai, Lessons from Polio Eradication, 473 NATURE 446, 447 (2011).
29. Barrett, supra note 9, at 55. During the same period local families in northern Nigeria were
suing a leading drug manufacturer for allegedly performing unethical clinical trials in the region. Larson
& Ghinai, supra note 28, at 446.
30. Larson & Ghinai, supra note 28, at 447.
31. Simon Denyer, For India, a Milestone in the Fight Against Polio, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2012,
at A10.
32. Jeffrey K. Taubenberger, The Origins and Virulence of the 1918 ‘Spanish Influenza Virus’,
150 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 86, 90 (2006).
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disease surveillance and tailored treatments, it will be extremely difficult to
respond to an emerging flu virus. The different challenges involved in
combating pandemic flu reflect the characteristics of single best-effort,
aggregate effort, and weakest-link global public goods.
Global surveillance of new strains of the flu virus highlights the
weakest-link characteristics of pandemic flu. In 2003, the SARS crisis
demonstrated the inadequacy of the existing legal framework for
responding to emerging global health challenges. Article 21(a) of the
Constitution of the WHO authorizes the adoption of regulations regarding
“sanitary and quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to
prevent the international spread of disease.”33 At the time, the WHO was
only allowed to rely on national governments for confirmation of an
outbreak within a given country. Amidst growing evidence of cases
originating within China, the Chinese government refused to reveal that it
had any cases of SARS.34 China did not even have a clear legal obligation
to report these cases because the existing regulations did not adequately
encompass new and emerging diseases. Under that system, the WHO was
entirely dependent on voluntary compliance by states in reporting
outbreaks.35
In the wake of SARS, the WHO dramatically overhauled the
International Health Regulations in order to better cope with the weakestlink problem posed by the threat of emerging diseases.36 As a result, the
WHO no longer needs to rely exclusively on state reporting and can utilize
other sources of data, including information from non-state actors who are
now integrated into the treaty’s surveillance functions.37 In addition,
national governments are now obligated to report “all events that may
constitute a public health emergency of international concern.”38 The
regulations include an affirmative obligation for states to develop and
maintain the capacity to detect, assess, and report new epidemics.39 Despite

33. World Health Organization [WHO], Constitution of the World Health Organization, art. 21,
para. (a), July 22, 1946, 14 U.N.T.S. 185.
34. Fidler, supra note 16, at 801.
35. Jeremy Youde, Mediating Risk Through the International Health Regulations and BioPolitical Surveillance, 59 POL. STUD. 813, 817 (2011).
36. David P. Fidler & Lawrence Gostin, The New International Health Regulations: An Historic
Development for International Law and Public Health, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 86 (2006).
37. David P. Fidler, Revision of the World Health Organization’s International Health
Regulations, ASIL INSIGHTS (April 2004), http://www.asil.org/insigh132.cfm.
38. World Health Assembly [WHA], Revision of the International Health Regulations, WHA
Res. 58.3, art. 6 (May 23, 2005).
39. Michael Baker & David P. Fidler, Global Public Health Surveillance Under New
International Health Regulations, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1058, 1060 (2006).
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these improvements, the first major test of the new regulations, in 2009,
was less than a resounding success.40
The challenge of financing the global response to pandemic flu
reflects the characteristics of an aggregate effort global public good. While
much of the global focus to date has been on surveillance and reporting,
less attention has been given to the role of treatment in slowing or
containing an emerging pandemic.41 Recent research has found that
important spillover benefits exist for flu treatments, which create some
incentive for wealthy countries to pay for treatment in low-income
countries.42 While the most cost-effective approach would be for wealthy
countries to provide medicines only to countries in which there is an active
outbreak, this might not be feasible in a fast-moving pandemic and
contributions to countries in proportion to their population could also be
cost-effective.43 A further challenge raised by the prospect of treatment is
that some countries, such as Indonesia, have previously refused to share
virus samples with international authorities without guarantees they would
receive an adequate supply of antivirals.44 Although this dispute prompted
new guidelines by the WHO, providing for the sharing of viruses and
vaccines, there is still no clear obligation for any country to share
treatments with another country.45 Without a more effective aggregate
effort to finance a global response, it is unlikely that the necessary level of
global cooperation with respect to information sharing will be achieved.
Unlike surveillance and financing, the innovation required to combat
pandemic flu has most closely reflected the characteristics of a single besteffort global public good. The WHO has limited capacity when it comes to
supporting drug innovation and is even less able to respond as rapidly as
required to develop new treatments to combat emerging flu strains. In
contrast, the United States does have significant capacity to rapidly
coordinate efforts to develop new treatments for flu and other emerging
diseases. Its Project Bioshield involves a multi-billion dollar effort to foster
40. Bradly Condon & Tapen Sinha, Chronicle of a Pandemic Foretold: Lessons from the 2009
Influenza Epidemic 1 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1398445.
41. See, e.g., Frank Smith, Look But Don’t Touch: Overemphasis on Surveillance in Analysis of
Outbreak Response, 3 GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE (Spring 2010).
42. Georgiy V. Bobashev et al., Policy Response to Pandemic Influenza 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Res.Working Paper No. W17195, 2011).
43. Id. at 41-42.
44. Peter Gelling, Indonesia Still Refusing to Share Bird Flu Samples, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/26/world/asia/26iht-web-0326-flu.5030534.html.
45. David P. Fidler & Lawrence O. Gostlin, The WHO Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
Framework: A Milestone in Global Governance for Health, 306 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 200, 200-01
(2011).
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innovation against a range of potential disease threats, including the
development of flu vaccines and antiviral treatments.46 Of course, the
reliance on such a single best-effort to develop new treatments also
highlights the related distributional challenges involved. Nonetheless, it
seems unlikely in the near term that rapid innovation to confront new
strains of the flu will be accomplished without such a single best-effort.
Pandemic flu reveals the limits of trying to categorize global health
challenges as either single best-effort, aggregate effort, or weakest-link
global public goods. Instead, the case study suggests a more promising
approach: to view these categories as highlighting the unique challenges of
innovation, financing, and compliance. It also suggests that despite the
priority that many state actors place on global preparedness for pandemic
flu, the first reports of a new strain are as likely to come from non-state
actors as from leading states. Re-conceptualizing the categories of global
public goods helps inform the approach and participants required at
different stages of global public goods production.
III. RETHINKING GOVERNANCE FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS
As the specific case studies reveal, different strategies and institutions
are required to respond to different stages of global public goods
production. The challenge of innovation in the context of global health can
often be accomplished through the efforts of a single country or a single
actor. Financing for global health rarely requires the participation of all
countries but usually depends upon contributions from a sufficient number
of well-resourced countries. However, compliance often depends on nearly
universal cooperation. New approaches to governance which take into
account these discrete challenges are crucial to enhancing the provision of
global public goods for health. While international institutions can
overcome some of the coordination challenges involved in the production
of global public goods, many of these institutions are not well placed to
overcome the underlying free-rider problem. Incorporating non-state actors
more fully into the governance of global health is one strategy that builds
on their increasingly important role in the production of global public
goods. Analyzing global health challenges through the lens of these
different stages of global public goods production makes it clear how
important non-state actors will be as part of the global response to health
challenges.

46. See FRANK GOTTRON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21507, PROJECT BIOSHIELD: PURPOSES
AND AUTHORITIES 7-8 (2009).
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A. Innovation
Innovation is a major global health challenge because well-resourced
countries and private-firms often lack sufficient incentive to make major
investments in diseases which disproportionately affect people living in
low-income countries. Non-state actors are becoming increasingly
important in this realm with foundations providing critical early stage
funding for the development of vaccines for many leading diseases. Yet
neither current market incentives nor philanthropy have yet proven up to
the challenge of fostering sufficient innovation when it comes to a wide
range of infectious diseases. Of the nearly 1400 new medicines developed
in the last quarter of the twentieth century, only one percent of these were
drugs which responded to tropical diseases or tuberculosis.47
The development of new malaria treatments reflects the crucial role
for a “single best-effort” in the realm of innovation and drug development.
To respond to the growing resistance of mosquitoes to existing treatments
in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War, the Chinese government
employed 500 scientists over a period of fourteen years to identify a new
treatment for malaria. Known as Project 523, the effort involved screening
40,000 known chemicals and searching sources from traditional medicine
in rural China.48 Ultimately, an herb that had been identified for its healing
properties as far back as 168 B.C. was determined to quickly kill the
parasites transmitted by malarial mosquitoes. The discovery proved to be a
tremendous advance in the global response to malaria and is now used as
standard treatment in combination with other slower acting drugs as part of
the artemisinin combination therapy. Insecticide treated bed-nets similarly
emerged from the efforts of national governments to reduce casualties from
malaria during World War II.49 However, both artemisinin therapy and
insecticide treated bed-nets only became widely available in low-income

47. See Suerie Moon, Medicines as Global Public Goods: The Governance of Technological
Innovation in the New Era of Global Health, GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE (Fall 2008/Spring 2009),
http://www.ghgj.org/moon2.2medecinespublicgood.htm.
48. World Health Organization [WHO], Ancient Chinese Anti-Fever Cure Becomes Panacea for
Malaria: An Interview with Zhou Yiqing, Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 87.10 (2010),
available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/87/10/09-051009/en/.
In the United States, a parallel effort led by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research to find new
treatments for soldiers who were contracting malaria in Vietnam led to the development of mefloquine.
See Christian Ockenhouse et. al., History of US Military Contributions to the Study of Malaria, 170
MILITARY MED. 12, 14 (2005).
49. Moon, supra note 47 at 4.
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countries after new financing mechanism generated economies of scale
which significantly drove down the unit costs of production.50
While the example of malaria reflects the potential and limits of
government led innovation, non-state actors are also playing an
increasingly significant role in shaping the direction of global health
research. A recent analysis of funding for major drug development
initiatives focused on neglected diseases found that foundations accounted
for more than three-quarters all investments.51 Non-state actors are also
centrally involved in re-shaping the markets for many drugs in the
developing world. Some of these actors are brokering long-term deals to
lower the costs of medicines, while others helped to catalyze major generic
producers to enter the market in the first place. The Gates Foundation alone
invested nearly $12 billion overall in global health between 1994 and
2008.52 One World Health, a drug development organization and the first
non-profit pharmaceutical company in the United States, has contributed to
new drugs now used against a range of infectious diseases.53
Ultimately, the underlying challenge to generating innovation in the
context of global health is to better align the incentives that link
investments with results. Smarter incentive systems for innovation in
global health become all the more important in motivating the necessary
single best-effort in a world in which diverse sets of actors are involved in
innovation. The incentives for global health innovation could be enhanced
through the adoption of new kinds of reward systems. For example, a
health impact fund might increase incentives for innovators to develop
medicines for some of the major killer diseases around the world by
rewarding them on the basis of lives saved in exchange for low-cost
distribution.54 A closer alignment between investments in global health
innovation and results is likely to be a critical feature of fostering future
innovation.

50. See Oliver Sabot, Response, One More Reason to Fund the Global Fund, 379 THE LANCET
e25 to e26 (2012).
51. MARY MORAN, ANNE-LAURE ROPARS, JAVIER GUZMAN, JOSE DIAZ & CHRISTOPHER
GARRISON, THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF NEGLECTED DISEASE DRUG DEVELOPMENT 34 (2005), available
at http://www.policycures.org/downloads/The_new_landscape_of_neglected_disease_drug_developme
nt.pdf.
52. Moon, supra note 47 at 11.
53. See Challenging Models-Changing Minds, ONE WORLD HEALTH, http://www.oneworldhealth
.org/history (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
54. Amitava Banerjee, Aidan Hollis & Thomas Pogge, The Health Impact Fund: Incentives for
Improving Access to Medicines, 375 THE LANCET 166 (2010).
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B. Financing
Despite important progress over the last decade, the challenge of
global health financing remains a major obstacle to the provision of global
public goods and a challenge of aggregate effort, since it is rare that a
single nation can or will invest the resources needed to generate an
adequate supply of global public goods. At the same time, this aggregate
effort increasingly involves diverse types of actors. The polio eradication
campaign points to the direct role of non-state actors in global health
financing, with the Rotary Club becoming one of the largest contributors
overall to the effort and the Gates foundation emerging as a leading
contributor in recent years.55 Just as important as this direct role in
financing is the indirect role of non-state actors in catalyzing resource
commitments by national governments. For example, the success of the
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) in resource
mobilization reflects, in part, the strong sense of ownership by diverse
stakeholders that has been fostered through their participation in the
governance of GAVI.56 With the slow growth of development assistance
for global health challenges, which doubled between 2001 and 2008,57 new
financing mechanisms are likely to become increasingly important in
delivering global public goods. A range of innovative financing
mechanisms have emerged over the last decade to finance global public
goods for health, but most of these mechanisms still require an aggregate
effort. One innovative approach to financing eradication campaigns is
through debt-swaps, in which countries that expand their immunization
coverage are rewarded with lower levels of debt. The buy-down
arrangement for polio eradication by the World Bank made a real
contribution to ensuring the stable supply of vaccines in that country and to
increasing levels of population immunity.58
While the exact mechanisms vary, most current approaches to
financing global public goods for health remain essentially voluntary. In
some cases, these contributions are treated as assessments or dues, based on
a fair share calculation, but nearly all investments by national governments

55. Dan Nielsen, The Global and Local Dimension, in INNOVATION IN STRATEGIC
PHILANTHROPY: LOCAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 139, 141-43 (Anheier et. al. eds., 2007).
56. See Kenneth Abbott & David Gartner, Reimagining Participation in International
Institutions, J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL (2012).
57. INST. FOR HEALTH METRICS & EVALUATION, University of Washington, FINANCING GLOBAL
HEALTH 2011: Continued Growth as MDG Deadline Approaches 7 (2011).
58. Muhammad Ali Pate, IDA Credit Buy-Down for Polio Eradication in Nigeria (2010) (Apr. 2,
2012, 7:18 PM), http://www.fininnov.org/img/pdf/19%20-IDA%20buydowns%20Nigeria.pdf.
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in delivering global public goods for health are still voluntary.59 One
mechanism which has moved beyond discretionary financing is UNITAID,
which relies on designated airline taxes implemented at the national level to
generate resources.60 Shipping and aviation fuel taxation has also been put
forward as an approach to financing global public goods for health that
would be less subject to the fluctuations in donor contributions.61 While
distinct from the current voluntary mechanisms for mobilizing resources
for global health, even these innovative mechanisms would still require the
aggregate effort of a wide range of countries implementing these policies in
order to be effective. The central challenge for global health financing is to
move from purely voluntary mechanisms of fostering aggregate effort to
more automatic mechanisms that catalyze adequate financing to deliver
global public goods.
C. Compliance
One of the most difficult obstacles to delivering global public goods
for health is the challenge of securing nearly universal compliance. When it
comes to the surveillance and reporting of emerging diseases, the new
International Health Regulations continue to lack effective enforcement
mechanisms. In the global health context, there is no significant
international capacity to impose costs for non-compliance within current
legal and institutional arrangements. Nor are there mechanisms for
individual states to enforce obligations through self-help, as is sometimes
the case in other sectors. The challenge of compliance when it comes to
global public goods for health remains a weakest-link problem in which
new sources of pressure are often required to foster cooperation.
In the absence of centralized tools that foster universal compliance,
decentralized strategies often become the last line of global defense. The
challenge of compliance in delivering global public goods for health
depends upon the capacity of a wide range of actors to increase the costs to
states of non-compliance and to help overcome resistance among subnational actors. Reaching universal compliance requires cooperation that
extends to the level of local communities, to non-state actors, and even to
individuals. Decentralized disease surveillance can serve as an important

59. See Richard Smith et. al. Communicable Disease Control: A Global Public Good Perspective,
19 HEALTH POL’Y & PLAN. 271, 275 (2004).
60. How Innovative Financing Works, UNITAID (2007), http://www.unitaid.eu/en/about/innovat
ive-financing-mainmenu-105/163 (last visited Feb.25, 2012).
61. BILL GATES, INNOVATION WITH IMPACT: FINANCING 21ST CENTURY DEVELOPMENT 14
(2011).
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global first warning system in the absence of effective state compliance
with reporting requirements.
Increased involvement by non-governmental organizations responding
to the challenge of disease surveillance is extremely valuable in fostering
decentralized compliance. The involvement of non-state actors has proven
quite important to increasing rates of polio immunization; community
participation was crucial to the acceptance of polio vaccines by parents in
India and contributed to the decline of cases in northern Nigeria beginning
in 2007.62 The weakest-link challenge in global health requires a
decentralized approach to governance through which diverse actors can
contribute directly to disease surveillance and catalyze states and subnational actors to cooperate in implementing global health interventions.
CONCLUSION
The concept of global public goods offers a useful frame for analyzing
a range of pressing global health challenges. The categories of weakestlink, single best-effort, and aggregate effort global public goods reveal
distinct obstacles involved in responding to emerging infectious diseases
and eradicating major diseases. Yet these categories are less helpful in
differentiating particular global health challenges than they are in
highlighting different dimensions or stages of these challenges. Innovation
in the global health context is primarily a single best-effort problem, global
health financing is usually an aggregate effort challenge, and compliance
generally reflects a weakest-link problem. The recognition that different
dimensions of global health challenges require distinct approaches suggests
that diverse models of governance may be necessary to ensure the
provision of global public goods for health. Innovation requires a better
alignment of incentives with results, financing increasingly depends upon
creating more automatic mechanisms for capturing resources, and
compliance demands more decentralized means of enforcement.
While global health is the focus here, it is plausible that these stages of
innovation, financing, and compliance could usefully be applied to other
types of global public goods as well. For example in the climate context, it
is likely that innovation, in areas such as geo-engineering, will reflect a
single best-effort. However, the financing of a comprehensive response to
climate change will surely be a challenge requiring an aggregate effort.
While the overall challenge of compliance mitigating greenhouse gases has
sometimes been framed as an aggregate effort problem, it could also be
62. ELISHA RENNE, THE POLITICS OF POLIO ERADICATION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA 34 (2010).
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viewed as a weakest-link problem since it likely requires the participation
of all the major emitters to be successful. Without the involvement of both
China and the United States no climate agreement has much chance of
ultimate success regardless of the aggregate effort of other nations.
In applying the concept of global public goods to contemporary global
challenges, existing tools of analysis can be applied in innovative ways in
order to better understand the key challenges involved in innovation,
financing, and compliance. At each key stage, non-state actors are
transforming the landscape of global public goods production and
highlighting the need for new forms of governance. Contrary to the
conventional wisdom that wider participation is an obstacle to effective
collective action, incorporating a wider range of stakeholders can
strengthen the global capacity to deliver global public goods.

